In its “A Week in the Horn” report, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) raised issues on the Saudi Arabia – East African Partnership Forum,  the preparation of Africa's Committee for the Copenhagen Conference,  Ethiopia-Djibouti High Level Joint Commission,  a controversial conference on Eritrea and  the need of  action in Somalia.

The Saudi Arabia – East African Partnership Forum launched

The Saudi Arabia - East African Forum, which aims at forging closer economic cooperation between countries of eastern Africa and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, kicked off on November 14th with the opening of an exhibition staged by 50 Saudi and 20 Ethiopian companies. The product range of Saudi exhibitors covered fruit juices, plastic goods, fertilizer, agricultural machinery, and other items, while the main attraction on the stands of Ethiopian exhibitors were agricultural and horticultural products as well as traditional clothing in modern fashion designs. The services of high profile companies including Ethiopian Airlines, Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation and Dashen Bank were also on display. The exhibition, the first of its kind, was attended by Prime Minister Meles, Ato Kuma Demeksa, Mayor of Addis Ababa, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Assaf, Saudi Minister of Finance, Dr. Fahd Balghniam, Saudi Minister of Agriculture, and Dr. Ahmad Muhammad Ali, President of the Islamic Development Bank Group, as well as Mr. Bernard Makuza, the Prime Minister of Rwanda.  

The central element of the forum was the investment conference opened by Prime Minister Meles the next day at the UN Convention Center. The forum was attended by the Presidents of Djibouti and Somalia, the Prime Minster of Rwanda  and the Deputy Prime Ministers of Kenya and Uganda, together with the Ministers of Finance, Trade and Agriculture, Commerce and Industry and Transportation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Communication, Trade and Industry and Finance of Ethiopia as well as other senior government officials, diplomats and business leaders from Saudi Arabia and the Eastern African region and the Director-General of the Tanzanian Investment Centre, were also present.  

Opening the Forum, Prime Minister Meles expressed his appreciation to King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud and his government for the initiative and for the vision behind the project to build a solid link between Saudi Arabia and the countries of East Africa. He welcomed the Saudi Ministers and other officials and members of their delegation for associating themselves with an historic initiative which he said would prove a trial-blazer in the consolidation and deepening of ties between Saudi Arabia and East Africa. The Prime Minister also acknowledged the role of Sheikh Mohammed Al-Amoudi ─ a Saudi and an East African ─ for his efforts to bring this event about. The Prime Minister underlined the fact that the potential for economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the eastern African region was grossly under-utilized. He emphasized the need to take advantage of the complementary nature of the economies of the countries of eastern Africa and Saudi Arabia. Other East Africa leaders also expressed their desire to strengthen economic cooperation with Saudi Arabia, providing  details of existing economic potential in their respective countries and inviting Saudi investors to be part of their development efforts. 

The Saudi-East African Forum envisages increased investment in the agricultural sector of Eastern African countries with a view to combining Saudi financial capital and technological know-how with the natural resources of Eastern African countries. The aim is to help ensure food security for all concerned as well as maximize the economic benefits to be gained from the development of the agricultural sector of the region. The Eastern African region has a combined population of 300 million people and has been one of the fastest growing regions in Africa. It possess abundant natural resources, especially in the agricultural sector, waiting to be tapped by investors.  

Africa's Committee of Ten prepares for the Copenhagen Conference

The Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), also known as the "Committee of Ten", convened on November 17th at the Headquarters of the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa, under a mandate from 13th Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government at Sirte in July. Three countries were represented at Heads of State and Government level, with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, President Mwai Kibaki, and President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni present. Algeria, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo and South Africa were represented at Ministerial level, and Libya and Mauritius by their Permanent Representatives to the African Union. The Meeting was chaired by Prime Minister Meles in his capacity as Coordinator of CAHOSCC. 

Opening the session, Dr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, emphasized that the future of Africa was at stake. He stressed the entire continent expected concrete results from the negotiations in Copenhagen, something far beyond any mere declarations of good-will. Prime Minister Meles touched upon the historic decisions made by the African Union on this issue:  the establishment of a single delegation to represent Africa in the negotiations and the preparation of a common African position.  He noted that Africa would engage in Copenhagen with one voice and in a constructive manner looking for a robust, fair and practical agreement. He emphasized that Africa had virtually contributed nothing to global warming, but was nonetheless placed to lose the most and to be hit first by its effects.  This is what made it imperative that Africa and its Group of 10 should  do their utmost to make Copenhagen a success.

The meeting focused on the following key issues:

To finalize a common position towards the global climate change negotiations scheduled for next month in Copenhagen, within the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, taking into account recent developments.

To devise an institutional mechanism for consultation among members of  CAHOSCC.

While Africa's preference at Copenhagen is, of course, to agree on a comprehensive treaty, it should nevertheless be prepared to engage with the rest of the international community to adopt a binding political agreement so long as this will address all the key issues identified in the Bali Roadmap and is consistent with the Kyoto Protocol, and as long as any political agreement is to be followed by immediate negotiations to provide for a comprehensive treaty. Mitigation and adaptation were highlighted as key concerns to Africa. On mitigation, Africa insists that the increase in global temperature does not go beyond 2 degrees centigrade, and that global carbon emissions should peak by 2020 at the latest.  On adaptation Africa insists that it must be compensated for the damage caused by developed countries to the prospects of growth by African countries. It requires that substantial funds in the form of adaptation resources should be made available early and that Africans should have an adequate say in the management of these funds.  The funds must be devoted to the most vulnerable regions and countries of the world of which Africa has the largest share. A study by the UK Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change has calculated global warming could cost Africa around 30 billion dollars by 2015; and that the figure could rise to between 50 billion and 100 billion by 2020 because of the increasing costs of dealing with climate change.  

The meeting ended by reaffirming that AU states will be speaking with one voice at Copenhagen next month. At the Summit level, Ethiopia will have the responsibility of putting Africa's position, while a mechanism will be established to coordinate ministerial activity with Nigeria leading the expert team and Algeria the ministerial level. The meeting noted that the African delegation will use the common position adopted by the AU assembly in July 2009 as its basis while taking into account any current developments in the negotiation process. 

The Ethiopia-Djibouti High Level Joint Commission

The First Ethio-Djibouti High-level Joint Commission and the 10th Joint Ministerial Commission meetings were concluded last weekend after extensive week-long bilateral discussions and negotiations. The High-Level Joint Commission was presided over Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and President Ismail Omar Guelleh of the Republic of Djibouti. This was the first time the bilateral mechanism between Ethiopia and Djibouti had been upgraded to this level and it emphasized the depth and width of bilateral cooperation between the two states. The only other country with which Ethiopia has this level of bilateral mechanism is Sudan. Bilateral mechanisms need to be commensurate with existing levels of cooperation.  

The co-operation between Djibouti and Ethiopia covers almost all areas and the focus of the meetings was to evaluate the implementation of existing cooperation and to address any impediments which might have appeared in the processes. In this regard, the joint follow-up mechanism was revitalised and a number of new agreements were reached to allow existing cooperation to deepen and expand. The level of cooperation and coordination in foreign relations especially with reference to regional peace and stability was commended.  It was agreed to enhance the level of consultation by maintaining the regular consultation between the two Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Both countries stressed the need to revitalize IGAD as a vehicle for regional integration as well as a mechanism to combat illegal migration and human trafficking, both threats to regional security.  

Delegations from both countries appreciated the growing dynamism in the areas of economic cooperation and infrastructural development.  The Power and Fibre Optic interconnection project will be finalized soon. The Ethio-Djibouti Railway is due to be transformed with a new standard gauge railway envisaged. The road connections to the borders will be upgraded. The trade relations between the two countries are strong with people, goods and capital moving freely. It might be noted that the flow of investment appreciated sharply after the signing of an agreement on preferential investment and acquisition of property. 

The meeting can be seen as a milestone in our bilateral relations. Guided by the pursuit of mutual interest it underlined the complimentary nature of the economic interests of Djibouti and Ethiopia. The attending delegations were guided by this spirit of mutuality and interdependence which will help to further expand cooperation. Ethiopia and Djibouti will continue to be pillars of stability and prosperity and to offer a model of regional integration. In strengthening their relations, they also contribute to the resolution of intra- and inter-state conflicts in the region, displaying the benefits of mutual cooperation and good neighborliness.

The Security Council and Eritrea

On Thursday this week a resolution was tabled in the UN Security Council calling for sanction on Eritrea for its activities and support of the extremist and terrorist opposition to the TFG on Somalia. The Resolution was immediately referred to the experts without further discussion. It is unlikely to come up for a vote or for further consideration before next month. 

It is this in circumstances that the track record of Eritrea suggests that now would be the time for Asmara to resort to sweet talk.  The Eritrean leadership has never ever responded positively to reasonable approaches and to those who are open to compromise.  Prudent approaches and flexibility in the interest of the search for a win-win outcome are viewed by Asmara as signs of weakness.  What one should expect from Eritrea under these circumstances is intransigence and incomprehensible stubbornness.  

Unreasonableness is the signature behavior of the Eritrean leadership.  But not always and this is where many have been making mistakes.  Under this mistaken assumption many have taken positions in the past which have not been helpful for peace in the Horn of Africa.  Assuming  that the Eritrean leadership would not budge, many have been ready to abandon principles even when it was manifest that the position being taken by Eritrea was unreasonable. 

Many seem to have short memories.  The only time that the current Eritrea leadership has shown some level of civility in the past was when it was convinced that it was at the edge of the precipice looking down into the abyss.  Two episodes come to mind, both tragic and avoidable, but which the Eritrean leadership made ineluctable.  The first event took place on a Saturday, February 27, 1999 on the morrow of Isaias' Badme debacle.  The Eritrean President had refused to accept the OAU Framework Agreement starting from the first week of November 1998,  when the Agreement was tabled by the OAU at Ouagadougou in the presence of both leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia, until February 1999.  Prime Minister Meles accepted the proposal for peace immediately ad referendum and subsequently officially confirmed Ethiopia's acceptance within few days after he came back to Addis Ababa from Burkina Faso. 

The Eritrean President continued to refuse to accept the OAU proposal for peace until the liberation of Badme.  Within 24 hours of that event,  perhaps mistakenly believing that the Ethiopian army  would march past Badme, the Eritrean President wrote to President Clinton, not to the OAU Secretary-General, expressing readiness to accept the peace proposal and appealing for a ceasefire.  The Eritrean Ambassador in New York began pestering the OAU on the need for an urgent ceasefire. 

Within a few days, it became clear to the Eritrean President that the Ethiopian military strategy did not intend to advance past Badme.  Immediately that became apparent Asmara reverted to its intransigent mode.  What Eritrea did at Badme, Asmara said, was a deliberate and purposeful withdrawal in compliance with the request made by the OAU peace proposal and since the proposal did not require Eritrea to withdraw from the rest of occupied Ethiopian territory, Eritrea would not pull out from those areas. At this point, the Eritrean leadership saw no further immediate danger; thus a new phase of intransigence and arrogance by Eritrea began, making the later May 2000 military confrontation unavoidable. 

What happened then was essentially a replay of February 1999 but this time many were prepared to give Isaias a cover for his retreat.  We don't intend to get into those details but anyone interested can go back to the three Communiques, by the UN, the OAU and by Asmara, put out on the same day, May 24, 2000, in a well calibrated manner and in a way which made it appear that Isaias was withdrawing his troops in response to requests by the OAU and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  The irony was that Isaias had no troops to withdraw.  They had all been defeated and were rapidly falling back in retreat and indeed were  already  back in their own territory.  The tacit message sent to Ethiopia by the UN and the OAU was that since Eritrea had already agreed to withdraw, there was no point in continuation of Ethiopian military activity, that is unless Addis Ababa had other ambitions.  This should be looked at in tandem with the sanctions resolution that had already been adopted by the Security Council. 

All this is food for thought for those who continue to question the policy of the Government with respect to how the war ended and how the decision was made to proceed to Algiers.  There are many things that should remain unsaid for now and for some time, but in the meantime what we should at least do is draw lessons from those events about the behavior of the leadership in Eritrea.  Both in February 1999 and May 2000, it acted in the same predictable manner, succumbing under duress while, in both cases, demonstrating absolute intransigence until the last minute, and an inability to consider what the most reasonable course of action might be, to the point of betraying a mindset almost bordering on the pathological. 

Now, Eritrea is, once again, being made to read the writing on the wall,  but this time not in a theater of war, rather on the diplomatic front, at a forum which is essentially the pinnacle of international diplomacy --- the Security Council.  Should one be surprised now if one sees a change of language in Asmara, or if the Eritrean President begins to appear to be less arrogant than months ago?  The historical record provides the answer. But the Eritrean leadership is not a bunch of fools. They know what is a bluff when they see one.  They are not yet absolutely convinced that what is going on now in New York is serious business.  But they cannot rule out the possibility. So what is now happening is a reflection of the state of mind in Asmara: a slight change in language without any change of substance.  Any real attempt at changing policy will only come when the Security Council proves to Eritrea that it means business.  It is then that the Horn of Africa will have moved one step forward, towards the goals of keeping extremism at bay and defending the rule of law.

A controversial conference on Eritrea and the Horn of Africa in Brussels.

On November 9th and 10th in Brussels, a Belgian NGO, Europe External Policy Advisers (EEPA), organized a conference to discuss EU and US policy on Eritrea and the Horn of Africa. Invitees included the Italian Institute for Political Science, regional ambassadors, EU and US officials, and Eritrean civil society leaders from the Diaspora, but a failure to include significant Eritrean opposition elements from the Diaspora caused considerable controversy. One opposition group called the conference “divisive, discriminatory and an interference in Eritrean internal affairs”. According to EEPA’s account of the conference a wide range of issues were covered including: an overview of Eritrea’s history in the Horn, an analysis of EU and US policy approaches towards Eritrea and the region, human rights concerns in Eritrea, the opening of Eritrea to democracy, empowerment of non-state actors, the plight of refugees, respect for the rights of ethnic and minority groups, and respect for the freedom of religion. The conference’s focus on Eritrea was underlined by the choice of speakers who included the former Prime Minister of Norway, Mr. Bondevik, the head of the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights which has just produced a devastating and detailed expose of human rights in Eritrea; Professor Bereket Habte Selassie, the former Chairman of the Constitutional Committee of Eritrea, in absentia, and Dan Connell, Professor at Simmons College, Boston whose paper was entitled “Eritrea and the US: towards a new US policy”.

As was apparent in its conclusions and recommendations, the conference emphasized the wider remit to cover the whole of the Horn of Africa, raising serious questions about the intended aim of the conference, and its methodology. In fact, the conference did make a number of specific recommendations about human rights and governance in Eritrea, as well as various other recommendations, but most were carefully phrased to extend the intent  from Eritrea to the whole of the Horn of Africa, and surprisingly (and inaccurately) making no distinctions in a number of areas between Eritrea and other states. There were calls to strengthen non-state actors, for the international community to put democracy and the promotion of human rights higher on their agenda, for EU development aid to be implemented more strictly in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement, for the UN to appoint international commissions of enquiry for human rights in Ethiopia and Somalia as well as Eritrea, to work with IGAD to promote economic cooperation and integration over food security in the Horn of Africa, to actively support the transition to democracy in the Horn countries, or promote civil society in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia as well as Eritrea.  

Many of these may be sensible recommendations, and all relevant to Eritrea, but it is hard to see why the organizers diluted the focus on Eritrea by referring to other countries, and not always applicably. The impression left is that this was a deliberate attempt to water down the emphasis on Eritrea and the criticisms of its present government and leadership. This is underlined by the fact, most surprisingly, that the conference recommendations make no reference to Eritrea’s foreign policy activities, including the recent detailed evidence of Eritrea’s admitted support for terrorist and extremist organizations operating against  Somalia’s internationally recognized government, and its present efforts, and again undisguised, to destabilize Ethiopia, Djibouti and, reportedly, and most recently Yemen. Reports this week suggest that arms have been reaching Yemeni opposition forces through Eritrea. It has to be said that it is difficult to see how any conference on Eritrea and the Horn of Africa could possibly avoid consideration of Eritrea’s policies of external aggression.  

One recommendation deserves particular comment as it is a further attempt to divert attention away from the activities of the Eritrean Government. It is the first of the recommendations listed by the EEPA: “the unconditional implementation of the final and binding decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC)”. The implication of this of course is to put pressure on Ethiopia, and the fact that this issue was raised at all in any conference intended to consider the internal activities of the Eritrean Government and its human rights policies, suggests the organizers had been listening to Eritrean Government propaganda rather than trying to fulfill the role suggested by the conference title. 

The boundary issue was the subject that formed the central element in Dan Connell’s paper, “Eritrea and the US: towards a new US policy”. Professor Connell was once a highly committed supporter of President Issayas, but he now argues that the US and the EU should support Eritrean opposition forces in exile to prepare for a transition to a democratic government while attempting to break down the way President Issayas supports himself in power by his claims that Eritrea’s existence is threatened and by isolating the population from all alternative sources of information. Preparation for this will take a long time and Professor Connell believes the Eritrean opposition has a long way to go before it is ready. Where it becomes difficult to follow Professor Connell is when he suddenly suggests that democratization either in Eritrea or among Eritrean opposition in the Diaspora must be linked to the border dispute. He says that the US and the EU should move “aggressively” to pressure Ethiopia to implement the Boundary Commission Decisions. Interestingly one of the Eritrean commentators on the conference thought that the real aim of the meeting was for the Eritrean government, through the EEPA, to emphasize just this point, to loosen the diplomatic siege that Eritrea is currently facing.  

Exactly how Mr. Connell can reach this conclusion is difficult to say as he also notes, quite correctly, that the war in 1998 was an attempt by President Issayas to dominate the politics of the Horn, and admits that a resolution of the boundary question will not resolve this. He also calls for pressure on Eritrea to implement its constitution, release political prisoners, and protect religious groups. This would provide the ground work for free and fair elections, but he then adds that it would be extremely unlikely for the government to act on any such reforms while President Issayas remains in power.  

There are two issues here, one of fact, the other of intent. The Boundary Commission’s Decisions on the Eritrea Ethiopia border were announced in 2002. Ethiopia, despite some serious reservations, accepted them in full in 2004, making it clear it was prepared to hold an immediate dialogue with Eritrea to implement the decisions and normalize relations. The Eritrean Government refused any discussions as it has done consistently since, or to consider any approach to normalization. Rather, it set about systematically dismantling the peace process, taking over the Temporary Security Zone created by the Algiers Peace Agreements in 2000 to divide the two armies, and in 2008 forcing the UN Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) to leave the TSZ whose security UNMEE was supposed to guarantee. In effect, these actions tore up the Algiers Agreement and despite all efforts by Ethiopia, by others countries, and by the UN, Eritrea has consistently refused to hold any dialogue with Ethiopia, to make any effort to normalize relations,  to restore the status quo ante in the TSZ or to reactivate the Algiers Agreements. Rather, it has systematically made efforts to destabilize Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and now Yemen, claiming to be “frustrated” over the failure of the international community to enforce implementation of the Boundary Commission's decisions, a failure for which it has itself been largely responsible.  

There is in fact no link between the resolution of the Boundary Commission’s Decisions and Eritrea’s continual regional aggression and support for extremist and opposition elements in neighboring countries. Nor has there ever been, except in Eritrean propaganda claims. Eritrean foreign policy is dictated by its own hegemonic aspirations and by internal considerations, which have no direct relevance to the Boundary Commission Decisions. As numerous observers have noted, the Eritrean Government’s refusal to implement the Decisions or normalize relations means the regime can consistently claim it is in a state of war with Ethiopia. In this context it is worth repeating that it was Eritrea which started the conflict in May 1998 by invading Ethiopia, as the Claims Commission has emphasized, and it has been Eritrea which has refused to implement the  peace process and normalize relations. This has provided the Government of Eritrea with its excuses to refuse to implement the Eritrean Constitution, approved by the National Assembly in 1997, to refuse to allow political parties, or elections, to close down all independent media in the country (Eritrea currently holds bottom place on the World Press Freedom Index), and to continue with conscription for all 18-50 year olds (with virtually no demobilization since 1997), putting the vast majority of the population under military law, and giving President Issayas carte blanche to destroy the organs of civil society.   

The other aspect of this argument is that, whether intended or not, it would give the Eritrean Government and President Issayas what he wants and would encourage Eritrea in its policies of belligerence and his efforts to acquire regional hegemony. As even Professor Connell admits President Issayas will not change his character. Deliberately pandering to the remote possibility that he might do so, can only be seen as unhelpful to regional peace and security. The first stage in looking for this must be to control the destabilizing activities of Eritrea. The current policies of the EU and the US which  essentially ignore this must be changed. An obvious start would be to support the requests of IGAD, the regional organization, and of the AU, the continental organization, for targeted sanctions. Eritrea’s ability to cause damage in the region must first be limited before it will be possible to encourage even limited engagement with Eritrea or work towards the construction of a stable and democratic regime in Eritrea. A very good place to start would be for the US and the EU to intensify the pressure on Eritrea, to act in a civilized and peaceful manner.

Action needed in Somalia, but it must be based on realities

Common sense, based on empirical facts, not wishful thinking, inevitably leads to the conclusion that the establishment of sustainable peace and security in Somalia requires three things. One is a viable central government that is the outcome of an inclusive and legitimate political process and is capable of delivering the basic services that any citizenry can reasonably expect from its government. Secondly, such a government needs international support for its financial and security needs to deal with the activities of those bent on violence to try and spread their extremist ideology, and enable it to gradually establish its authority over the territory of the country. The third requirement is that the international community should be prepared to take a firm stand and act against those acting as ‘spoilers’.   

The facts, and the needs of government, are clear enough. Unfortunately, common sense doesn’t always seem to prevail among academic circles, particularly those who try to elaborate sophisticated analyses and look for trendy “out of the box” solutions which ignore historical facts and the reality on the ground. A typical example of this was the recent article on Somalia by Ms. Bronwyn Bruton in the November/December issue of Foreign Relations. Using faulty assumptions and avoiding much of the evidence about the situation on the ground, Ms. Bruton’s latest piece suggests the US should make certain highly speculative policy shifts. If applied, all the indications are that these would actually shatter any prospect of sustainable peace and security in Somalia.

In essence, Ms. Bruton advocates two things. The first is a so-called policy of "constructive disengagement". This would involve abandoning the idea of a central government authority and concentrating any (minimal) assistance on a bottom-up governance strategy through support to community-based development efforts. The second element would be a de-listing of specific individuals and organizations, including Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, from the list of international terrorists as part of a campaign to entice them away from conflict and extremism to join the process of peace and reconciliation. Ms. Bruton argues that Washington must learn to co-exist with Al-Shabaab as this movement is “a coalition of fortune” and is therefore susceptible to realignment under the right conditions, and the quickest way to create these conditions is to open the door to co-existence with western powers. The basic problem of this proposed shift is of course that there is absolutely no evidence from present activities or past history that provides any reason to suppose these organizations or individuals might consider seriously this idea for a moment. In fact, all indications are entirely to the contrary. Most recently, Al –Shabaab for example declared its intention of carrying out terrorist activities in Uganda and Burundi, in South Africa, Kenya, Djibouti, Ghana, the United States and Israel; it has already extended its activities to Somaliland  and Puntland. It is very obvious that any such effort would certainly encourage these groups and worsen the situation in Somalia, probably to a point of no return.  

In fact, the recommendations put forward by Ms. Bruton appear premised on the idea that Somalis are somehow different from everyone else and unlike others do not want or need a functional government, at least for the time being, because they disagree about questions as fundamental as the form of the State, whether it should be unitary, federal or confederal, and about the nature of the judicial system, whether it should be wholly Islamic or remain a hybrid of Shari’a and secular justice. Frankly, the suggestion that Somalis are unlike others and are apparently incapable of working out their differences of finding a political solution that can accommodate their differences, is insulting to say the least. Ms. Bruton ought to be aware that the current Transitional Federal Government is the result of a long, arduous and inclusive political process, which brought together all sections of Somali society under the auspices of the international community. The most recent extension of the process was the Djibouti Agreement of last year. Neither the legitimacy nor the all-inclusive and representative nature of the TFG is not in doubt. 

Ms. Bruton’s second set of recommendations is based on the argument that, under current conditions, any efforts to create a viable central government by supporting the TFG and rejecting extremism is a recipe for prolonging the conflict. Ms. Bruton suggests that the effect of resisting extremism and terrorism is to radicalize and unite groups and individuals who would otherwise be competing against each other or who could, with the right incentive, be persuaded to follow a peaceful path and support the Government. This is apparently based on the erroneous and naive belief that these hardened terrorists, some of whom have received training in Afghanistan, can be somehow be appeased and be persuaded to cast aside their extremism and their religious beliefs. To characterize someone like Sheikh Dahir Aweys in these terms as a pragmatic political figure seems exceptionally reckless. This is a man who participated in the Al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. Embassies of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, which left scores of innocent civilians dead, and who praised the suicide car bombings of September 2009 in Mogadishu in which 21 peacekeepers were killed and who called for more of the same. His background in terrorism goes back to the terrorist activities of Al-Itihaad Al Islamiya in Ethiopia in the 1990s. Putting the blame for this sort of unjustifiable terrorism on the involvement of the international community in Somalia, rather than on the actual criminals who actually boast of their actions, does seem to be perverse at the very least.  

The policy shift that Ms. Bruton is recommending is based on the idea that the threat posed and the violence perpetrated by extremists in Somalia is actually hyped up more than it deserves. She, and others, suggest that Somalia is fundamentally inhospitable to foreign Jihadists, and that the acknowledged presence of Al Qaeda operatives in Somalia, though alarming, does not mean that transnational terrorism is really present or will spread. These arguments are simply untenable. They are obviously contrary to the actual situation on the ground and denied by all credible intelligence reports. Indeed, intelligence reports suggest that in Somalia today there are currently thousands of foreign jihadist fighters under the banner of Al Qaeda including large numbers in the eight training camps run by Al-Shabaab. According to a senior Al-Shabaab commander, Sheikh Mohamed Sheikh Abdullah, who defected earlier this month, many come from Kenya as well as hundreds from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Chechnya, Sudan and Tanzania. 

One only has to look at publicly available records including the testimony of intelligence experts to the US Congress or listen to the tape recordings of Al Qaeda's number two, Sheikh Zawaheri, expressing support to these fighters and instructing them to continue their actions. Similarly, the pledge of allegiance by these groups in Somalia to Al Qaeda is a matter of public record. The last recording issued by Al Shabaab under the explicit title "At your service Osama" speaks for itself. This is a very clear repudiation all the arguments that Somalia is somehow inhospitable to Al Qaeda and that it could not possibly become a safe haven for terrorist groups.

The fact is that Somalia will become more and more safe and acceptable for Al Qaeda so long as its ‘foot-soldiers’, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, remain undefeated and able to operate. But they can be defeated. It has happened before as in 1996/1997 when the parent organization of these groups, Al-Itihaad Al Islamiya was soundly defeated and collapsed. It can certainly happen again but it needs concrete action and firm resolution from the international community not Ms. Bruton’s allegedly “constructive disengagement”.