In it’s  “A Week in the Horn” report, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) raised issues on the hopeful sign in Somalia, the joint commission meeting of Ethio-Djibouti, Eritrea’s greatest fear of the peace, democracy and unity of Ethiopia and US Policy in Somalia.

The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Somalia, Mr. Charles Petrie visited Mogadishu this week. The UN representative met with Prime Minister Omar Sharma'arke and other TFG ministers, pledging to open the UN Office in Mogadishu as soon as possible. He said the international contact group for Somalia and the UN Security Council would be meeting soon to discuss how to disburse the funds pledged by the international community at the Brussels Conference in April, quickly. This can only be characterized as a positive development, but the need for urgent and concrete action remains.

Recent events have underlined the point. In central Somalia, in the Hiiraan region, the town of Belet Weyne has again changed hands with one of the extremist opposition groups, Hizbul Islam, retaking control. Hizbul Islam's presence has, however, not been welcomed by the local population with elders and a local MP, Hussein Haji Mohamed "Gagale" speaking out publicly against the presence of Hizbul Islam in Belet Weyne. There have been reports that the previous governor of Hiiraan region, Sheikh Abdirahman Ma'ow, who had been linked to Hizbul Islam has now joined Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a which has been fighting successfully against Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab terrorists in neighbouring regions. The government in Mogadishu this week reported the defection of a prominent Al-Shabaab commander, Sheikh Mohamed Sheikh Abdullahi “Pakistan” to the government. At a welcoming ceremony in the Prime Minister's office, Sheikh Mohamed said he had left Al-Shabaab because the organization had committed anti-Islamic activities, including the beheading of innocent people. Al-Shabaab this week distributed a document demanding any aid organization operating in the areas of Bat and Bakool regions should follow a list of eleven strict rules. These include a ban on promoting democracy, a requirement to fire all women and replace them with men within three months, a refusal to allow Sunday as a day off and a ban on celebrating Christmas as well as a ban on alcohol and movies, and the removal of all logos from vehicles. The agencies will also have to pay fees of $40,000 a year.

The events in Hiiraan clearly demonstrate the need for the international community to make good on its promises to the TFG, in terms of economic and security assistance, so that the TFG can reinvigorate its fight against those 'spoilers' driven by a jihadist ideology and bent on causing havoc. The UN Security Council needs to act with the greatest sense of urgency to curb the activities of these 'spoilers' intent on destabilizing Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia by imposing sanctions against Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, and their backers.

Meanwhile it is just over a year since five terrorist bombs hit Hargeisa in Somaliland, and Bosasso in Puntland. Among the targets, which included the Ethiopian Trade Office and the presidential Palace, was a UN facility in Hargeisa where the explosion of car bombs caused the death of two UN staff members and the injury of six others. On 29 October 2009, the UN held a commemoration ceremony in Hargeisa. The attacks serve as a stark reminder of the need to remain constantly vigilant about activities of extremists. Although Somaliland has been, by and large, peaceful and stable, the threats persist from groups such as Al Shabaab, whose agenda as part of the global jihadist movement, goes far beyond Somalia. A number of Al-Shabaab come from Somaliland, including its leaders. A number of recent terrorist operations, including assassinations in Puntland this week, emphasize the problem.

It underlines once again the need for urgent action by the international community without further delay and the necessity for active support for governance wherever it is effective, through the TFG, in Somaliland and Puntland or through local committees and civil society structures. It is this which will provide for the political and administrative reconstruction necessary, provide the resources for reconciliation and for incentives to help local communities counter the threats posed by terrorist organizations.

This week's Ethio-Djibouti Joint Commission meeting

The Ethiopian Djibouti Joint Ministerial Commission held its 10th meeting this week in Addis Ababa with Ato Seyoum Mesfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs leading the Ethiopian delegations and Djibouti's delegation headed by Mr. Mohamoud Ali Youssouf, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Djibouti. The relations and interests of Ethiopia and Djibouti are intertwined in numerous ways. They are ties together by history, geography and kinship as well as having mutually interdependent interests in trade and communication which necessitates close and sustainable cooperation. Both countries also face a common problem in their neighbour, Eritrea. It is in light of these links that Ethiopia and Djibouti have been holding regular meetings of the Joint Ministerial Commission. The Commission provides a mechanism for the coordination of cooperation and allows for reviews of the status of the implementation of their ongoing cooperation. It also offers the opportunity to explore further areas for cooperation.

In advance of the Ministerial level meeting, senior officials and experts reviewed the current status of cooperation and present levels of implementation in political and security areas, in the economic, trade, transport, infrastructure, and social spheres. The Ministerial meeting deliberated on the report and recommendations presented by senior officials, and devised ways and means to deepen existing friendly relations and to ensure full implementation of the existing bilateral agreements. Both sides agreed to exert all possible efforts to strengthen existing mechanisms of cooperation and to revitalize all the bilateral committees at every level. The ministers emphasized the need to synchronize efforts to strengthen cooperation for the mutual benefit of the two peoples and for the peace and stability of the region. To expand the areas of cooperation, agreements covering education and health sectors were signed. Minister Seyoum and Mr. Mohamoud Ali Youssouf also took the opportunity to exchange views on the political and security situation of the region.

Eritrea’s greatest fear: the peace, democracy and unity of Ethiopia

The regime in Eritrea talks endlessly about Ethiopia. One of the favourite pastimes on Dehai and other official websites is to give publicity to what it claims are Ethiopia's political or economic difficulties. Negative reports are told and retold to the Eritrean public and any Ethiopians who watch Eritrean TV. Not surprisingly, given the Eritrean government's media reputation, such aimless propaganda is viewed with disdain. The public in both countries are fully aware of the situation in Eritrea, and know that these stories emanate from a group of people who are actually responsible for holding its own public as hostages and in complete isolation from neighbours and from the rest of the world.

Indeed, the regime in Asmara is now in the dock of world public opinion and before the United Nations Security Council for repeated acts of destabilization threatening international peace and security in the Horn of Africa. Its repeated attacks against its neighbours with Djibouti being the latest victim, has shown the regime’s propensity for violent and unprovoked attacks on others. The reckless group running Eritrea has for far too long been excused as a new country with little international experience. However, after 16 years patience has finally begun to run out. This was first apparent in the Horn of Africa in the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Then the entire African continent stood together against a regime and a group that is only prepared to acknowledge force as the means to resolve disputes. It operates as the antithesis to peace. Worse, Eritrea openly supports terrorist groups. The regime's gravest fear is that peace in the region would remove its last lame excuse for postponing constitutional government in Eritrea. It is afraid that with peace, and an army finally demobilized, the Eritrean people would demand immediate changes in their situation. It would no longer continue to accept, however unwillingly, the forced conscription and the slave-like labours of the country's youth, depriving them of educational opportunities.

The Eritrean regime has been long on record that it does not consider democracy to be applicable to the people of Eritrea. It appears to have the extraordinary notion that as long as the government considers the country to have foreign foes, it can refuse to allow any system of free political expression or divergent views. It has repeatedly said that multi-party democracy, freedom of expression and indeed most other human and democratic rights, are not necessarily the best ways to ensure good governance in the country. Eritrea, of course, has neither a free press nor any opposition. Both are forbidden. All those who dare to express critical views are dealt with utmost severity. The latest report on human rights in Eritrea claims there are at least ten thousand political prisoners. As a result, democracy in Ethiopia is viewed by the regime in Eritrea as a grave threat, with Eritrea's immediate neighbour setting an “unfortunate” example. In fact, the success of democratization in Ethiopia is viewed by the regime in Eritrea as a very real threat to its own tight grip on power. Moreover, with democracy taking firm root in Ethiopia the possibilities of subversion lessen sharply as the system makes it far less likely that any discontented group would be prepared to serve as agents for Eritrea’s efforts of destabilization.

The most laughable aspect of current Eritrean propaganda is the claim that the Eritrean regime stands for Ethiopia’s unity. Eritrea is making this ridiculous declaration while it simultaneously organizes and arms terrorist elements against Ethiopia. It is supporting such elements with the intention of trying to install puppets to implement its aim of gaining illegal economic advantages. Gullible groups among Ethiopians abroad and others espousing extremist views have allowed themselves to be used as pawns by the regime in Asmara in efforts to destabilize Ethiopia. It has continued in such policies despite the repeated evidence of failure. The fact is that the federal constitutional system in Ethiopia, about which Eritrea is so critical, has strengthened the unity of the country. Unity is now built on the full recognition of the history, culture, language and political status of each of the peoples and nations in the country.

 These differences in attitude towards democracy, peace and unity in fact largely explain Eritrea's attack on Ethiopia in May 1998, an unprovoked attack concealed as a boundary dispute. It's a technique Eritrea has used again and again. A boundary issue was used by Eritrea to wage war against Djibouti and others as well as Ethiopia. At the same time it has been an issue used by the apologists of Eritrea to try to justify Eritrea’s flagrant and consistent breaches of the UN Charter. It does of course provide nothing of the kind. Eritrea's aggression towards its neighbours and its support for terrorism and destabilization has no relationship to any boundary dispute, and even less to its internal repression. It is high time, indeed long overdue, and essential for the people of Eritrea and the Horn of Africa, for the international community to finally hold Eritrea to account, to push the Eritrean regime to allow the people of Eritrea to exercise the basic human and democratic rights they have been denied so long, and provide for a peaceful future for the Horn of Africa. 

The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held on Monday and Tuesday this week in Sharm-El-Sheikh, Egypt, and its opening session was attended by 15 Heads of State and Government from invited countries and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. Participants included Foreign Ministers and Economic Cooperation Ministers from 49 African states. The Ethiopian delegation was led by Prime Minister Meles, invited to the conference in his capacity as the chair of IGAD. Ato Seyoum Mesfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ato Sufian Ahmed, Minister of Finance participated in the Ministerial Conference.

During the conference, Mr. Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister of the Peoples Republic of China, announced eight new measures to be implemented over the next three years to strengthen China-Africa Cooperation. These included proposals to foster China Africa partnerships in such areas as climate change, science and technology, financing capacity, trade, agriculture, health, human resources development and the expansion of people to people and cultural exchanges. China will build one hundred clean energy projects involving solar power, bio-gas and small hydro power, carry out a hundred joint demonstration projects on scientific and technological research, and provide US $10 billion in concessional loans to African countries to help build up their financing capacity as well as providing zero-tariff treatment to 95% of the products from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) of Africa. It has further pledged to increase the number of agricultural technological demonstration centers in Africa to twenty, provide medical equipment and anti-malaria materials worth RMB 500 million, and train at least 20,000 professionals.

At the conclusion of the conference two documents were adopted. These were the Declaration of Sharm El-Sheikh and the Sharm El-Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012) for FOCAC. The Declaration is a document in which China and Africa affirmed their commitment to deepen their partnership in a spirit of political equality, mutual trust and economic win-win cooperation. The Action Plan spells out agreed areas of cooperation between the two sides, and covers political and international affairs, economic cooperation and development as well as cultural and people to people exchanges and cooperation.

The fourth FOCAC Ministerial conference was a complete success. It demonstrated once again that China's practical and concrete support to Africa's development has continued in full swing. As Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said in his remarks at the opening of the conference, the "golden era" of our partnership is beginning. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, further stated that the vibrant partnership between Africa and China is based on two fundamental principles which are the principle of solidarity between Africa and China and the principle of seeking win-win solutions. The principle of solidarity which had been abundantly manifested during the anti colonial struggle of Africa is, the Prime Minister continued, the basic structure through which Africa-China partnership is expressed. He said that the principle of seeking win-win solutions operates within the framework of solidarity and reflects the commitment of the two sides to ensure mutual benefit in each other's engagement rather than the maximization of benefits to one or the other side.

Prime Minister Meles further said that there are some who worry that in the current gloomy international environment of economic and financial crisis that this uniquely successful partnership might falter. He stressed that he has no such worry and that the best days of Africa-China partnership are ahead of us. In this connection, he said "the continued success of China makes it possible for us to guide our partnership to a new and even higher level." He also said that the continued growth of China and the accelerated improvement in the income of Chinese workers mean that because of higher labor costs, some industries in China would become less competitive and may necessitate their relocation to places such as Africa. African leaders should take necessary measures to benefit from such opportunities and seek win-win solutions. Hence, his conclusion that he believes "the golden era of China-Africa partnership is just beginning."

The FOCAC was launched in October 2000 as a platform for collective consultation, dialogue and partnership to strengthen friendly relations and jointly meet the challenges of the Millennium Development Goals. The first Ministerial Conference was held in Beijing that month adopting the Beijing Declaration and the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development to provide a framework for the establishment of a new type of long-term stable partnership based on equality and mutual benefit between Africa and China, and a blueprint for cooperation. Subsequent ministerial meetings were held in Addis Ababa in December 2003 and in Beijing in November 2006, preceding the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC which adopted an action plan aiming to boost bilateral cooperation to a higher level and strengthen cooperation in politics, economy, international affairs and social development.

 During his stay in Sharm El-Sheikh, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi also held talks with the President of Egypt, Mr. Mohammed Hosny Mubarak, and discussed bilateral, regional and international issues of common concern. The Prime Minister also exchanged views with Mr. Wen Jiabao on bilateral issues specifically on the further strengthening of existing economic cooperation between China and Ethiopia in infrastructure, hydro electric power projects, telecom development, road construction and in new areas of cooperation, including the sugar industry.   

US Policy in Somalia: She gets it wrong again

Articles in Foreign Policy magazine carry a certain cachet. The magazine believes, no doubt correctly, that it has influence on Congressional deliberations and on administration policy makers. Inevitably there will be interest with an article beginning “The US Government needs to change its Somalia policy – and fast” (“In the Quick sands of Somalia”, Bronwyn Bruton, Foreign Affairs Vol.88 no.6 November/December 2009). Interest becomes concern, however, when the argument is based on serious distortions and numerous inaccuracies. There is a pattern of error, exaggeration and simplification, even a sublime disregard for inconsistencies and contradiction. These start on the first page. Al-Shabaab is not “a radical youth militia” (as indeed the article makes clear later) nor are its terrorist actions “isolated incidents”. Ms. Bruton, showing an exaggerated respect for the rhetoric of TFG opponents, claims any international action in Somalia will reinforce an “anti-Western culture in Somalia”, even adding that boosting AMISOM's strength is “a fool's errand”. This is a view drawn directly from the output of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam who wish to see the withdrawal of support from the TFG and from the AU peacekeeping force, AMISOM. It was AMISOM which prevented their Eritrean-backed effort to seize power in May in Mogadishu. It is also a view propagated by some Somali intellectuals in the Diaspora and certain clan leaders dissatisfied with President Sheikh Sharif's division of ministries and offices to their clan, or themselves.

In August, Ms. Bruton wrote a very similar piece for the Council for Foreign Relations “The US Policy shift needed in the Horn of Africa”. We drew attention then to a number of the errors in A Week in the Horn (“Rethink US policy perhaps, but forget the analysts”, 14.8.2009 www.mfa.gov.et). In this, as in earlier pieces for the CFR, and this latest article in Foreign Affairs, the central problem of Ms. Bruton's analysis is her unquestioning acceptance of opposition claims with no apparent effort at verification or investigation, repeatedly seeing events through the prism of opposition to the TFG from the supporters of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, even using these sources to explain US policies.

Ms. Bruton is certainly raising issues of concern in looking at questions over how to confront terrorism in Somalia and on how to deal with the issue of governance in Somalia. Her solution, however, is both drastic and implausible, and hardly likely to improve stability in either Somalia or the region: the US should withdraw support from the TFG, but promote development without regard to governance, limiting counter-terrorist efforts to monitoring and “de-radicalisation” in co-operation with local populations. Ms. Bruton admits the results might not be palatable to Washington. Indeed, she might have pointed out that her suggestions appear to be aimed directly at giving the extremist factions a victory and leaving an Al Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab in control, with increased numbers of active terrorist training bases, and terrorist activities spreading in the region, and indeed more widely.

It might be noted that Fazul Mohammed, the Al Qaeda operative who planned the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 2008 with over 200 dead, has just been appointed head of Al Qaeda in East Africa at a ceremony held in Kismayo, the southern Somali port controlled by Al-Shabaab. This gives added point to the latest Al-Shabaab threats to expand its activities outside Somalia, to attack Uganda and Burundi, Kenya and Djibouti, as well as South Africa, Ghana, Israel and the US. Al-Shabaab, of course, attempted to bomb an army base in Australia earlier this year, and carried out bombings in Somaliland and Puntland in October last year, following these up with other operations more recently. Rather unconvincingly, Al-Shabaab recently included Eritrea in its list of potential target: unconvincing because Eritrea, as part of its persistent efforts to destabilize Ethiopia, is the main supporter of attempts by Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam extremist forces to overthrow the TFG as it demonstrated in May, and has been the main external 'spoiler' of international efforts to resolve Somalia's problems. Eritrea's significant role in Somalia's chaos and confusion is totally ignored by Ms. Bruton here and her failure to consider the role of Eritrea in the region is one of the major lacunae in this and in her previous papers for the Council for Foreign Relations.

Ms. Bruton's analysis is based on numerous errors, many propagated by opposition to the TFG and supporters of extremism in Somalia. The ICU did not bring “unparalleled stability” to Mogadishu in 2006 as was demonstrated by the immediate and total rejection of the movement by the general population and by a majority of clan leaders and the business community at the end of December. She seriously exaggerates its support in Mogadishu, the degree of order it generated and entirely fails to mention that the replication of sharia courts outside Mogadishu was largely imposed by military force. She ignores Eritrea's role in trying to build up the ICU forces as a threat to Ethiopia, the ICU's call for a jihad against Ethiopia or the resurrection of Somali irredentist claims against Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. Incidentally, far from selling the idea of an Al Qaeda controlled ICU to the US in 2006, Ethiopia made every effort to open talks with ICU leaders during 2006, a total of eight meetings were held, the last only days before the ICU's declaration of war.

Ms. Bruton's account of events after December 2006 is simplistic and exaggerated as well as frequently inaccurate. TFG and Ethiopian forces made significant headway against Al-Shabaab and extremist forces in Mogadishu in 2007 and 2008. It would have required minimum effort to check this in independent sources. It is a pity Ms. Bruton did not do so. Reconciliation efforts have been at the center of TFG efforts at governance since its inception, and more particularly since early 2007. One might also note the continued involvement of Ethiopia in such efforts in Mogadishu throughout 2007-2009, something of which Ms. Bruton appears unaware. She suggests human rights abuse, allegedly confined to TFG and Ethiopian forces and US air strikes, led to jihadists from the Middle East pouring into Somalia and forcing Ethiopia to withdraw its forces in early 2009. She ignores the clan dimensions of the conflict, the tactics of Al-Shabaab and other extremist elements in Mogadishu and their widespread tactics of human rights abuse including their admitted targeting of civilians, and the political developments in the Djibouti peace process which allowed Ethiopia to withdraw its troops in January this year when President Sheikh Sharif was elected President. One might add that Sheikh Sharif's willingness to engage with Ethiopia has only damaged him with a very small ideological minority not in the eyes of the general public.

Incidentally, it is deeply disturbing to see a reputable academic publication continuing to allow references to Ethiopia's “invasion” of Somalia or its “occupation” of Mogadishu. Ethiopia was involved in Somalia at the invitation of the TFG and helped in security issues in Mogadishu but most of the action against Al-Shabaab and extremists in Mogadishu was carried out by the TFG with Ethiopian support. It was not an occupation by any stretch of the imagination. Nor, despite Ms. Bruton's claims, did Ethiopian forces engage in “rampant human rights abuses” whether firing of mortars at hospitals or indiscriminate shelling of civilians. At no point did Ethiopian forces deliberately aim at civilians.

Al-Shabaab did not appear in 2002. The original impetus behind its formulation came from former Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya leaders and it might be noted that the core elements were a group who had gone to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan, several sent by Sheikh 'Aweys' in the early 2000s. Ms. Burton, ignoring the numerous claims of abuse committed by Al-Shabaab and other extremist forces, even suggests most excessive actions have been carried out by “illiterate children” rather than by “radical leaders”. This is a claim for which there is no evidence and no probability, and there is absolutely no reason to designate Al-Shabaab as no more than “ a brutal local political movement” as Ms. Bruton would apparently like us to do. Al-Shabaab didn't recruit “a host of angry, desperate, young fighters” radicalised by US and Ethiopian atrocities, though it did raise some of its forces from ordinary clan militias through its ability to pay its fighters and by calling on clan alliances. More significantly, it also brought in some outsiders, experienced terrorists, through its links with Al Qaeda.

It wasn't the Bush administration which made Somalia a front against terrorism. Terrorism in Somalia, and the region, goes back a lot further. Ms. Bruton claims Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya was defunct by the mid 1990s, but her view of Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya is almost entirely wrong. “Most of the country” did not fall under its control at any stage and its capacity for external terrorist activity was largely destroyed by Ethiopia's cross-border operations into Gedo region in 1996 and 1997, after Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya carried out a whole series of terrorist bombings in eastern Ethiopia and in Addis Ababa in the mid-1990s. Equally, Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya did not become “essentially defunct” nor disappear though it was forced to leave Gedo region. Elements of it participated in the Islamic Courts and subsequently reappeared in Hizbul Islam, chaired by Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys', Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya's military commander in the 1990s. Hizbul Islam also includes the Ras Kamboni brigade, headed by Sheikh Hussein 'Turki', another Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya military leader in the 1990s. These are the people that Ms. Bruton suggests are interested in accommodation with the TFG in Somalia today, despite their own repeated statements to the contrary. It shouldn't be necessary to remind her that Sheikh 'Aweys', after two years in Eritrea, arrived back in Mogadishu in April this year with a couple of plane loads of arms to launch, together with Al-Shabaab, an attempted overthrow of the TFG.

Ms. Bruton makes virtually no mention of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a apart from repeating an Al-Shabaab claim that it had been given support by Ethiopia. It hasn't, as any reference to Ahlu Sunna would confirm. It might also be noted that far from playing the disruptive religious role Ms. Bruton suggests, the role of Ahlu Sunna has been one of moderation and mediation, of stabilization in contrast to Al-Shabaab. Ms. Burton seriously underestimates its influence, its numbers and the extent of its support.

Of greatest concern perhaps, is the superstructure that Ms. Burton has built upon these errors, and the use she wishes to which she wants to put it. She claims Al-Shabaab is part of a “coalition of fortune [and] susceptible to re-alignment” and that therefore the US should live with it. Ms. Bruton tries to disassociates Sheikh 'Aweys' from Al-Shabaab ideologically, arguing that he is an opportunist who would be prepared to de-link Hizbul Islam from Al-Shabaab if the US would take him off its terrorist list. Her assertion that Sheikh 'Aweys' has “expressed a keen desire to be taken off the [terrorist] list” may be true but the views consistently expressed by Sheikh 'Aweys' paint a very different picture of his aims and intentions. Ms. Bruton claims it is in the US interest to distinguish between the different extremist elements arguing that “this would mean not taking all pro-Al-Shabaab rhetoric at face value” but this is exactly what she has already done in suggesting that the US should support the removal of AMISOM, disband the TFG or most bizarrely relocate it outside Somalia. These proposals arise from the belief of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam that it is only AMISOM which prevents their successful takeover of power in Mogadishu. It is a rather obvious attempt to achieve their own agenda by other than military means.

Ms. Bruton claims it is accepted wisdom that “almost any international action is likely to reinforce the Somalis' anti-western posture”. It is not. It is a view that might provide ammunition for the propaganda of Al-Shabaab and its supporters outside Somalia, but it bears little relationship to the reality on the ground and the views of a majority of Somalis. The anti-US sentiment to which Ms. Bruton refers is not the product of a majority of ordinary feeling in Somalia so much as the views of an ideological and intellectual leadership among small, if highly vocal extremist factions in Somalia and in the Diaspora. Ms. Burton's attempt to pick up on Chester Croker's apposite phrase “constructive engagement”, with her “constructive disengagement” is clever but amounts to no more than a synonym for abandoning Somalia and the TFG, a policy which would have widespread ramifications in the region, in Africa and among US allies globally. Ms. Bruton's failure to consider any of the possible repercussions indicates her suggestions are, to put it mildly, useless and even dangerous. No doubt, it is useful to try to think out of the box, if indeed there is a need to re-evaluate the policy of the international community toward Somalia. We say the policy of the international community because, the policy the US is following in Somalia at present is more or less in line with the consensus within the international community. It is a position supported by IGAD, the AU, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference and the UN. While the possibility might not be ruled out, it is unlikely for all these to be wrong. What Ms. Bruton is suggesting is adopting an irresponsible stance which will have no possibility of advancing the cause of peace and stability in Somalia, nor of promoting US interest.

What is most striking about Ms. Bruton’s approach is how she continues to run away from facts that do not support her major thesis. The fact that the Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya was defeated and, to all intents and purposes, was destroyed as a fighting force by Ethiopian troops in 1996 is a historical fact which might serve as an inspiration in terms of the challenge which Al Shebab and other extremist groups now pose to the international community. The defeat of Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya in 1996 demonstrates that these groups are not invincible, contrary to the conclusion that Ms. Bruton wants us to draw by avoiding considering critical historical facts.

 As we suggested last time when we took up another piece on Somalia by Ms. Bruton hers is a narrative which is embraced by some including by those, like Eritrea, who continue to try to make us believe that the sources of the problem in Somalia are AMISOM, Ethiopia and those who stand firmly behind the Djibouti process and the TFG. Ms. Bruton’s analysis this time is more sophisticated but it is as unhelpful and as dangerous as her previous piece.