The headline to the UN's own report on the Security Council meeting on Somali last week said it all: “Many challenges still needing international attention”. High among them is the issue of sanctions to deal with “spoilers” as requested by the regional body, IGAD, and the African Union, as long ago as May. Despite the wealth of detailed evidence available, from the Somali Government and from the UN's own Monitoring Group, and the highly public continued activities of the main “spoiler”, Eritrea, the Security Council still seems unable to make up its collective mind.

In the briefings to the Council, the Secretary-General did not actually name Eritrea though he made clear the essential need to stabilize the security situation in Mogadishu and for the international community to redouble its support and rally behind the TFG,a government which Eritrea has made quite clear it wants to see removed. The UN Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, Lynn Pascoe, emphasized the importance of the Djibouti Agreement as the structure which provided a path for the Government to follow. Mr. Pascoe told the meeting that the Government has overcome repeated attacks by foreign-funded and heavily armed groups. These, of course, included the attempted coup by the Eritrean-supported Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab in May. Mr. Pascoe did not refer to Eritrea by name but he noted that targeted sanctions could be an effective way to deal with “spoilers” and would allow for a flexible approach.

Some of the other speakers at the Council meeting were less circumspect. The Permanent Representative of the UK, expressed concern over reports that Eritrea had provided support to armed opposition groups in Somalia and made it clear the UK was prepared to support the AU's request for sanctions against Eritrea.. The US condemned continued military offensives against the TFG , described the issue of “outside actors” as serious. It identified Eritrean actions as serious and said it was time for the international community to consider Eritrea's destabilizing effect on the region. Bourkino Faso and Uganda called for action against “spoilers”. Mexico, the chair of the Sanctions Committee on Somalia, appealed to the international community to support the Monitoring Group in implementing its mandate. The latest report of the Monitoring Group will be considered by the Sanctions Committee later this month. Mexico said implementation of sanctions should be consistent with the approach adopted in the sub-region. Russia condemned supporters of terrorism and called on regional states to prevent the flow of foreign mercenaries into Somalia. China condemned recent attacks on the Government and said that the UN should not wait passively for conditions to change but should play a greater role. Other members such as Austria also made constructive contributions in this important debate by the Security Council.

Eritrea, predictably, denied everything, continuing apparently to believe that repeated denials can convince despite the detailed evidence of arms supplies to Hizbul Islam and open support for Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys' and Al-Shabaab which led to the AU's request to the UN for sanctions. It is the same approach adopted by Eritrea over its invasion of Djibouti last year, claiming that any and all evidence against it had been fabricated. Eritrean Information Minister, Ali Abdu, told Reuters that “the accusations have no bearing whatsoever with the facts. They are completely baseless”. He then suggested that Britain had supported sanctions for “ulterior political motives” and its action was “unacceptable and illegal”. In a bid to try and head off sanctions, Eritrea's Foreign Minister has been criss-crossing the Middle East and Europe apparently suggesting to all his interlocutors that they each should convene a peace conference on Somalia. The intention is to appear to be pro-peace. This would appear more plausible if Eritrea had not made every effort to scuttle the successful Djibouti peace and reconciliation process last year by refusing to let Somali politicians in Asmara attend. Eritrea's open support for Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam makes Eritrea’s recent attempts at the diplomatic front nothing but crude deception. The two organizations have made it very clear they will only talk to those who agree with them and have refused to deal with any moderate elements or with the TFG. It is in fact obvious that the Eritrean suggestion is not intended to be taken seriously. It is no more than a last desperate attempt to delay Security Council action against Eritrea.

As US analyst Dr. Peter Pham noted in a column yesterday (“Eritrea: Spoiler Exacerbates Crisis in the Horn of Africa and Beyond”) it is extremely frustrating on one of the rare occasions when Africa has managed to act together, as they did in calling for sanctions against Eritrea, that its efforts have been largely ignored by the UN Security Council, “to the detriment of both the African states immediately bearing the brunt of the assaults from Asmara and the broader security interests of the international community.” Dr. Pham rehearsed the evidence against Eritrea in detail, adding that while deliveries of arms and ammunition by small boats originating in Eritrea continue fairly regularly “a far greater proportion of Eritrean assistance...now takes the form of contributions in cash or kind.” Cash is made available from an Eritrean embassy account in a nearby country or hand-carried from Asmara by courier. It may then, he said, be sent via Western Union or hawala agencies to Somalia. The cash may be handed to sympathetic businessmen who use it to buy food, clothes or electronic goods, which are then exported to Somalia and sold to finance the “armed struggle”. Dr. Pham adds that the UN Monitoring Group believes Eritrea's arms embargo violations take place with the knowledge and authorization of senior officials in the Eritrean Government or the ruling PFDJ, and that operational responsibility lies with Eritrean intelligence services. Dr. Pham concludes by arguing that President Issayas believes “he [can] stoke the fires of Islamic extremism and yet maintain control of the flames, which he [hopes] to direct at his longtime Ethiopian rival.” He adds : “Before the entire neighborhood and areas beyond are consumed in the conflagration unleashed by the increasingly erratic Eritrean despot, the international community needs to demonstrate in no uncertain terms that his dangerous gamble is a sure loser.” It is hard to disagree.

It is indeed true, as the UN suggested, that many challenges still need international attention in Somalia. One of these is Africa's request for action against “spoilers” in Somalia and Eritrea. There is no doubt that this would be one simple but immensely valuable way to assist the resolution of some of the problems of the TFG. There is really no further reason for the Security Council to fail to act.

Somalia's Joint Security Committee holds its third meeting

The third meeting of the Joint Security Committee took place on Monday, meeting in Nairobi for the benefit of the international community members attending. The Joint Security Committee was set up under the Djibouti Agreement to strengthen the security capacity of the government. Its members include senior representatives of the TFG security institutions and AMISOM officers as well as representatives of the AU, the UN and the international community including the EU, IGAD, the League of Arab States, Norway and the US. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah told participants that the security forces needed to be better organized and strengthened: “ What has been achieved since the May 7th attempted coup is great, but more needs to be done.” He was referring to the failure of the extremist, Eritrean- backed, attempt by Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys' and his Hizbul Islam coalition and Al-Shahaab to seize power in Mogadishu. Mr. Ould-Abdullah told the meeting to continue their commitment to dialogue and to working together closely to achieve peace and stability. He said the international delegates were there to help, not to study or delay contributions to assist. He urged the international community to remain focused on key priorities including security, humanitarian assistance and human rights as well as development. Mr. Ould-Abdallah thanked the committee members for their dedication, singling out the AMISOM force commander and his deputy: “The courage of the AMISOM troops and their heroic conduct will never be fully appreciated at their true value”, he said.

Meanwhile, the conflict between the two terror organizations operating in Somalia, Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab continued to unfold this week. Their disagreement doesn't, of course, stem from any difference in ideology or any dispute over the means to be pursued to attain their common objective. They share a similar objective, which goes beyond Somalia and the region, seeking to propagate an extremist Jihadist ideology through the use of violence against innocent civilians. Both have pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden's terrorist network, as evidenced yet again through their pronouncements after the horrific suicide car attacks of last month against AMISOM. Both have recruited hardcore foreign fighters bent on deploying the most extreme methods to pursue their agenda.

Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam emerged from the ruins of the Islamic Courts Union. Al-Shabaab was originally the youth wing of the ICU with its leaders known to have received training in Afghanistan for the explicit purpose of extending Al Qaeda's war to Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab is the better organized and more cohesive, both militarily and logistically. Hizbul Islam was created in early 2009 under the auspices of Eritrea where Hizbul Islam leader, Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys' resided between January 2007 and April 2009. It is a loose grouping of four distinct Islamist and clan-based organizations and includes a number of foreign fighters. The fighting in Kismayo between Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab has nothing to do with ideological differences. It is a conflict over ownership of the land and resources available in Kismayo, a conflict over control. This explains the reports this week that some fighters from Hizbul Islam have abandoned their organization and joined the Transitional Federal Government. But make no mistake. This is not any sort of indication that Hizbul Islam is more moderate. It just means that it is less effectively organized.

Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam do not just pose a threat to Somalia and the Horn of Africa. They are also a source of security concern for the rest of the international community as exemplified last week in a US Senate hearing to consider the evolving terrorist threat inside the United States. The Washington Post revealed that the FBI is investigating whether any American of Somali origin took part in the suicide bomb attacks of 17 September which killed 21 AMISOM peace keepers. In a written testimony to the hearing, FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller III, said "the role of returning foreign fighters to the United States changes the nature of the threat to the homeland". He said that while Al Qaeda was under more pressure than any time since 2001, the threat from affiliated groups such as Al-Shabaab was growing. This is certainly no time for any misguided or wishful thinking about what can only be described as two organizations devoted to extremist, terrorist action.

An IGAD Ministerial meeting to be held in Kampala

IGAD member states have decided to hold a Ministerial meeting to discuss the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan later this month. It has been scheduled for October 21 and will take place in Kampala the day before the start of the African Union Special Summit on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons. It is expected all IGAD member states will attend. The aim of IGAD's Ministerial Meeting is to discuss the implementation of the CPA and more specifically look at ways and means to strengthen mutual confidence between the parties, between the National Government in Khartoum and the Government of South Sudan. In recent months, a number of concerns have arisen over the implementation of the CPA and it has become apparent that the timetable has slipped badly. The National Census was supposed to have been held by July 2007. It was conducted in 2008 and the results were only released earlier this year, and were promptly rejected by the Government of South Sudan. The census is a necessary pre-condition of the elections supposed to have been held in 2008, then postponed to July 2009, and still not held. The Referendum Bill to govern the process by which South Sudan will exercise the right to self-determination under the CPA should have been enacted by July 2008. It hasn't yet been enacted. Other issues have also contributed to the growing concern about the prospect of peace in Sudan unless the current trend is corrected. It is generally agreed there is no alternative to the CPA and if it is to work, it must be fully implemented by both signatories, and fully supported by the international community. IGAD states are deeply involved in the whole CPA process, and any threat to the CPA is a threat to all of IGAD and to peace and security in the sub-region. IGAD member states have decided to organize this ministerial meeting with a view to assist in ensuring successful implementation of the CPA and to help maintain the peace process on the right track.

AU/EU Consultative Meeting in Addis Ababa

The Second Joint Consultative Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Political And Security Committee took place in Addis Ababa on Monday at AU Headquarters. The meeting took place in the overall context of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the Joint Partnership on Peace and Security. Ambassador Nkozi Yoyo, Permanent Representative of Nigeria and current chair of the AU Peace and Security Council, and Ambassador Olof Skoog of Sweden, which currently holds the EU Presidency and chairs the EU Political and Security Committee, co-chaired the meeting in which the two sides agreed to work together on regional peace-making efforts in Africa. On Somalia, the two sides agreed to renewed co-operation over AMISOM as well as improved support for the TFG as well as making further efforts to address the humanitarian situation in Somalia. Their final communique noted the need for a comprehensive approach to include an inclusive dialogue within the framework of the Djibouti process as well as co-operation on anti-piracy efforts, and the necessity to address the issue of the sources of supply to the opposition to the TFG. On Sudan, the AU and the EU agreed to promote peace, reconciliation and justice. They welcomed the renewed AU efforts in Sudan and the work of the AU's High Level Panel for Darfur. Its report will be presented to the AU's Peace and Security Council at the special Summit on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, in Kampala later this month. The two parties agreed to support the CPA and the aim of free and fair elections in 2010 and the referendum in 2011. More generally, the AU and the EU reiterated their concern about what is seen as a growing phenomenon of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa. They also agreed to explore more ways to work together in the context of different international contact groups and the legal framework of the Lome Declaration and the Cotonou Agreement.

Meanwhile, it was announced this week at a workshop in Kampala that the process of formulation of the East African Stand-by Brigade would be complete next month, and by 2010 the force, one of the five brigades for Africa, would be ready for operation. The brigade will have 7,000 military personnel and a civilian component of 360 for technical and decision-making matters. The countries contributing to EASBRIG are Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The workshop in Kampala has been focusing on the role of defense forces, regional and international co-operation, and peace support operations as well as areas of conflict management and conflicts over natural resources and borders. It aims to harmonize the training curriculum for military forces and create standard operating procedures for civilian and peace operations.

Chatham House and the ISS look at threats to democracy in Somaliland

Chatham House's briefing notes and papers on the Horn of Africa have not always managed to produce the kind of balance and authority that we would expect of such a prestigious organization. Its latest briefing note entitled 'Somaliland: Democracy Threatened' is, however, an impressive, detailed and balanced look at the constitutional and political dilemma that Somaliland has been facing in recent months and the dangers that this has posed. As we noted last week, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in Hargeisa on September 30th produced the necessary renewed commitment of Somaliland's political parties to free and fair elections, providing for the depolitization of the date of presidential election and for the appointment of a new, credible, National Electoral Commission to provide for a refined voter's list and fix a new election date.

Michael Walls, of Chatham House, has given a detailed and accurate background of the political problems which led to the recent crisis and the agreed MoU. He underlines the point that the difficulties that arose over the failures of the National Electoral Commission's technical abilities could not be resolved by any direct constitutional actions but only by application of the wording of Article 9 (1) of the Somaliland constitution: “The political system of the Republic of Somaliland is based on power, consultation, democracy and multiplicity of the political parties.” In other words, the Somali tradition of dialogue and consensus-building was the only real avenue for resolution of the crisis. It was this, assisted by the actions of Somaliland's friends, notably Ethiopia and the United Kingdom, which allowed for the MoU to be signed by all three parties recently. Mr. Walls notes that the MoU has now established the conditions under which dialogue and consensus-building can take place as happened in 1993 and 1996. This is, of course, a very significant step but equally a number of very hard decisions have yet to be made. These include the reformation of the National Electoral Commission and the necessary steps for acceptable voter registration before the election can take place. The remaining challenges are not therefore easy to address. They require the same level of wisdom and vision on the part of Somaliland politicians which was evident in the negotiation over the MoU and in the success they eventually achieved in that regard.

Mr. Walls concludes his paper by underlining the regional importance of Somaliland's continued progress down the 'path of stability and democracy'. Those involved in Somaliland politics, he says, need to work together in the Somaliland traditions of dialogue and consensus-building. Equally, the international community in general needs to pay much greater attention to the successes that Somaliland has achieved. As Ethiopia has consistently argued, continued refusal to acknowledge Somaliland's real achievements and the remarkable degree of stability it has reached runs the risk of contributing to the instability in the region. The international community still fails to understand the urgency of supporting the agents of stability within the Horn of Africa and the need to act, and act now, to prevent those supporting instability and destabilization from continuing their work. In the mean time, friends of Somaliland continue to hope that the remaining obstacles to a successful progress towards the next election will be jointly removed by Somaliland politicians with the same resolve to protecting the peace and security of Somaliland which has been a legacy they have preserved over the last decade and a half.

Indices of Governance and Misconceptions

There has been a proliferation of government assessment tools and government related indices in recent years. They include the World Bank Institute's Worldwide Government Indicators (WGI), UNDP's Governance Indicators Project (GIP), and the OECD Metagor Project. Among bilateral indices are USAID's Democracy and Governance Assessment Framework, the Netherlands Strategic Governance and Corruption Assessment (SGACA) and the UK/DFID's Country Governance Assessment, (CGA). There are many more. Latest additions are the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the Harvard Index of African Governance. These are worth additional comment as they are direct rivals. The Harvard Index is produced by Professor Rotberg, head of a program on conflict studies at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Over the previous two years he collaborated with the Foundation of Sudanese philanthropist and businessman, Mo Ibrahim, to produce the Ibrahim Index. Now they have gone their separate ways to produce rival lists. According to Mr. Ibrahim, the split came over Professor Rotberg's resistance to increasing input from African researchers and institutions. Professor Rotberg says the issue is one of academic freedom as against foundation control. Both, however, end up with much the same variables and largely similar conclusions even if details differ.

There is certainly a need for assessments of government performance, and indices of this kind can be very relevant to monitor and evaluate governance programs. They can have real value especially at a time of global economic crisis. The question that obviously arises is why are there so many assessment methodologies and how far they can be trusted, or to put it another way, what values are attached to these assessments. The aims and assessors differ, often wildly, and the methodologies involved are seldom comparable. According to an ODI study, "the [indices] use different approaches, but most are completely or largely external to the country for which the assessment is carried out. Further many governance indices and assessments are closely tied to (particular) donor agencies, which can present problems of credibility and legitimacy." Indeed, the issues of credibility and legitimacy are critical. Certainly, it can be argued that donor agencies, for example, might need indices to target their areas of intervention in a particular country, but the weight they give to the various parameters used and categories chosen reflect the values and realities of the donor. They are by definition detached from the values and realities of the targeted country and their relevance to governance may be minimal.

As mentioned, methodologies also differ. The inclusion or the exclusion of development indicators in governance indices is only one such variant. More serious in consideration of any use in government planning is the time gap often apparent. The Ibrahim Index is based on data available in 2007. In effect, the index is therefore almost two years out of date, failing to cover any recent progress in development and governance related issues. This is not a minor issue. In the last two years we have witnessed extraordinary world-wide economic changes. It has been a period in which agriculture development has been taken as a major contributor to poverty reduction, in which the obsession with a minimalist state has given way to emphasis on the developmental/interventionist model, where the world has had a financial and economic crisis from which it is now starting to recover. Indices based on the realities of 2007 can, at best, provide no more than an historical record. They certainly cannot necessarily be used as guidelines for current or future development.

Most governance indicators are based on perception surveys, and this raises a number of questions. Professor Joseph Stiglitz, Professor Amartya Sen and Professor Jean-Paul Fitoussi are the authors of the report produced last month by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress set up by French President Nicholas Sarkozy early last year. They note that: "... There often seems to be a marked difference between standard measures of important socio-economic variables like economic growth, inflation, and unemployment etc and widespread perceptions. The standard measures may suggest for instance there is less inflation or more growth than individuals perceive to be the case, and the gap is so large and so universal that it cannot be explained [by reference] to money illusion or to human psychology."

Whether statistics give us the right “signals” or not, in our efforts to revive the world economy while simultaneously responding to the global climate crisis, measurement, in our performance-oriented world, takes on increased importance. What we measure affects what we do. Leaving aside the detail of assessments based on perception surveys, there is a huge gap between statistically supported information and people's perception. Information based on perception surveys depends on various factors including availability of information to the general public on governance issues, the knowledge of respondents and misinformation from various sources on different governance agenda items. Governance indicators based on perception survey can only be perceptions and do not necessarily reflect the reality of the situation in any given area or at any specific time.

Nobody doubts the need for governance assessment. Equally, these must be based on the values and the realities of the country being assessed if they are intended to serve the country rather than the needs of donors or NGOs. The Paris Declaration, rightly, demands country ownership of governance issues. In this respect, it should be noted that African states have endorsed NEPAD as an African Program; and that they have also included the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as a way forward for governance assessment of African States. This process is inclusive. The reports contain the views of the government, the ruling and the opposition parties, the labour unions, manufacturers associations and chambers, NGOs and the public at large. Under the APRM, the information gathered is then submitted to a group of African eminent personalities for intense scrutiny. Their conclusions and recommendations are then widely publicized.

The APRM is country owned, subjected to evaluation by eminent personalities whose values do not markedly differ from the values and realities of the country. In addition, unlike most other assessments and indices, the APRM provides clear and implementable recommendations. Governance is not a beauty contest with competitive rankings, however much the international media try to make it so. But it is a challenge, and a challenging one, so its assessors should come up with implementable recommendations.

It is perhaps invidious after these strictures to recommend any of these governance assessments, but it has to be said that the Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress by Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi is well worth reading. It provides the basis for a better understanding of the use of statistics and some guidance for creating a broader set of indicators to evaluate well-being and sustainability and to improve assessment of the performance of the economy and of society more generally. We would benefit from both.